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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing so-
ciety.1 
 In 1986, the United States Supreme Court used Florida’s proce-
dure for determining mental competency for execution as a test case 
for banning execution of the mentally ill. 2 Under Ford v. Wainwright, 
“[t]he Eighth Amendment prohibits the State from inflicting the pen-
alty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”3 Even before it officially 
held that executing the insane violated the Eighth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court recognized that the government must perform its 
duty to execute sentences with “scrupulous fairness” to the accused.4 
By deeming execution of the mentally ill cruel and unusual, the 
Court afforded a degree of due process to inmates on death row.5 No 
longer is taking the life of the mentally ill simply within the “benevo-
lent discretion” of the State.6  
 Although Florida’s procedure may now be constitutional on its 
face, in practice, Florida continues to execute the mentally ill. 7 Tho-
mas Provenzano, for example, thought he was Jesus Christ. 8 He lived 
                                                                                                                  
 1. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). For a discussion on the modern view of 
capital punishment, see Alex Kozinski & Stephen Bright, The Modern View of Capital Pu n-
ishment, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1353 (1997); Symposium, Evolving Standards of Decency: 
The Evolution of a National Consensus Granting the Mentally Retarded Sanctuary, 31 CAP. 
U. L. REV. 351 (2003). 
 2. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416 (1986).  
 3. Id. at 410. 
 4. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 13 (1950). 
 5. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 399. For more information on due process and capital pun-
ishment, see Robert McAuliffe, A Procedural Due Process Argument for Proportionality Re-
view in Capital Sentencing, 21 COLUM . J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 385 (1988). 
 6. Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 15-16 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 7. It is important to note from the outset that this Comment does not advocate that 
the mentally ill should go unpunished when they commit heinous crimes. Nor does it try to 
undermine the resulting emotions experienced by victims and their families. It simply puts 
forth an alternative view for determining competency for execution. For a rationale sup-
porting the commuting of sentences to life in prison, see Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in Fan-
tasy: The Supreme Court’s Reliance on Commutation to Ensure Justice in Death Penalty 
Cases, 49 VAND. L. REV. 311 (1996); Lindsay A. Horstman, Comment, Commuting Death 
Sentences of the Insane: A Solution for a Better, More Compassionate Society, 36 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 823 (2002). 
 8. See Initial Brief of Appellant at 5, Provenzano v. State, 750 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1999) 
(No. 96,453). The doctor examining Provenzano stated: 
 Mr. Provenzano knows, not thinks or believes, that the reason that he is to be 
executed is because “They” believe that he is Jesus Christ. Those who seek to 
execute him hate and fear Jesus Christ and if he is dead then Jesus Christ is 
dead and that is their goal . . . .  
 He does not connect the courthouse shooting with the execution. It is unre-
lated because he is innocent. 
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on Florida’s death row until he was executed on June 21, 2000, be-
lieving that “They” wanted to execute him because “They” hated and 
feared Jesus.9 Pedro Medina, who was a nineteen-year-old inmate of 
a Cuban mental asylum, also lived on Florida’s death row.10 The 
State executed him even though he spent most of his life confined for 
paranoid schizophrenia and organic brain damage.11 Before their 
executions, Florida expressly declared both men mentally compe-
tent.12 
 This Comment takes a closer look at Florida’s procedures for as-
sessing mental competency for execution and proposes a new statute 
to reduce the number of inaccurate evaluations. Part II begins by ex-
amining Ford v. Wainwright as the potential cause of Florida’s insuf-
ficient procedure,13 and Atkins v. Virginia14 as a possible solution to 
the questions left by Ford.15 Part III explains Florida’s current proce-
dure for determining competency for execution and discusses sub-
stantive and procedural inadequacies in the present process. Part IV 
delves into alternative statutory models, including the American Bar 
Association standards and Florida’s procedure for determining com-
petency to stand trial. Based on these standards, this Section also in-
cludes the ideal Florida statute, elaborates the reasons and mecha-
nisms for bolstering the ideal statute’s substantive inquiry into men-
tal health, and notes the particular need for experts to pay attention 
to schizophrenia and post-traumatic stress disorder. The two tables 
at the end of this Comment show which types of tests measure cer-
                                                                                                                  
Id. The State executed Provenzano on June 21, 2000. Information on dates of execution 
and a current listing of death row inmates is available at http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/ 
deathrow/execlist.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003). 
 9. Initial Brief of Appellant at 5, Provenzano (No. 96,453). 
 10. See Medina v. State, 690 So. 2d 1241, 1250 (Fla. 1997). 
 11. See id. at 1250-51 (Anstead, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (pointing 
out that the majority failed to acknowledge that Medina was a nineteen-year-old inmate of 
a Cuban mental asylum, that he was psychotic, had organic brain damage, and paranoid 
schizophrenia). Medina was executed on March 25, 1997, despite the fact that “the State 
possessed evidence that implicated Joseph Daniels in the murder and failed to disclose this 
evidence to the defendant.” Id. at 1252. Information on dates of execution and a current 
listing of death row inmates is available at http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/deathrow/exe-
clist.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003). 
 The Cuban government exported Medina on the Mariel boat lift. In 1980, the Cuban gov-
ernment allowed 124,776 Cuban migrants, including a number of criminals and persons 
with mental illnesses to leave Cuba during the Mariel boat lift. U.S. Coast Guard Alien 
Migrant Interdiction, Mariel Boat Lift, at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/mle/mariel.htm 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2003). 
 12. See Provenzano v. State, 750 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1999); Medina, 690 So. 2d at 1241. 
The State executed Provenzano on June 21, 2000. The State executed Medina on March 25, 
1997. Information on dates of execution and a current listing of death row inmates is 
available at http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/deathrow/execlist.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003). 
 13. 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
 14. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  
 15. Although Ford v. Wainwright banned the execution of the mentally ill, it provided 
little procedural guidance to the states.  
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tain mental illnesses and provide a list of specific questions for men-
tal health examiners to answer when determining competency for 
execution. 
II.    AMBIGUITY IN THE WAKE OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
A.   The Beginnings of the Prohibition on Executing the Mentally Ill: 
Ford v. Wainwright 
 The ban on executing the mentally ill officially began with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ford v. Wainwright.16 In 1974, Florida 
convicted Alvin Ford of murder and sentenced him to death.17 Al-
though Ford raised no competency issues at the trial level, after be-
ing imprisoned his behavior changed and he demonstrated symptoms 
of confusion, delusion, and psychosis.18 He believed the Ku Klux Klan 
formulated a conspiracy to force him to commit suicide.19 The prison 
guards, as part of the “plan,” were “killing people and putting the 
bodies in the concrete enclosures used for beds.”20 His tormenters 
supposedly began by taking his family hostage, but by “day 287” of 
the “hostage crisis,” the list expanded to 135 people, including sena-
tors. 21 He believed he could not be executed because he owned the 
prisons and controlled the Governor through mind waves.22 Eventu-
ally regressing into total incoherence, he spoke only in a code saying 
things such as, “Hands one, face one. Mafia one. God one, father one, 
Pope one. Pope one. Leader one.”23 
 After the defense’s psychiatrist examined Ford for fourteen 
months, the psychiatrist concluded that Ford suffered from paranoid 
schizophrenia with suicide potential that hindered Ford’s ability to 
assist in defending his life.24 On the other hand, the three governor-
appointed psychiatrists jointly examined Ford for only thirty min-
utes.25 Though each found that Ford exhibited some kind of disorder, 
they concluded that he “comprehend[ed] his total situation including 
                                                                                                                  
 16. Ford, 477 U.S. at 399. For additional commentary on Ford v. Wainwright, see 
KENT S. MILLER & MICHAEL L. RADELET, EXECUTING THE MENTALLY ILL: THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE CASE OF ALVIN FORD (1993); The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-
Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100 (1986). For a description of competency for execu-
tion assessments post-Ford, see Kirk S. Heilbrun, The Assessment of Competency for Exe-
cution, in DEATH PENALTY (1987). 
 17. Ford, 477 U.S. at 401.  
 18. Id. at 402. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. (citation omitted). 
 22. Id. at 403. 
 23. Id. (citation omitted). 
 24. Id. at 402-03. 
 25. Id. at 404. 
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being sentenced to death, and all of the implications of that pen-
alty.”26  
 When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court’s plurality 
opinion began by observing that no states allowed the execution of 
mentally incompetent persons. 27 By noting that “the natural abhor-
rence civilized societies feel at killing one who has no capacity to 
come to grips with his own conscience or deity is still vivid today,” 
the Court essentially required full sanity prior to execution.28  
 Justice Powell’s concurrence in Ford suggested a procedure, used 
by Florida today, that does not require full sanity prior to execution 
and ignores the need for an individual to be able to assist counsel in 
his or her defense.29 Justice Powell stated, “I would hold that the 
Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are un-
aware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are 
to suffer it.”30 This view overlooks the possibility that the State may 
execute an inmate due to the inmate’s inability to communicate new 
exculpatory information to the attorney. Justice Powell also disre-
garded the need for protection through procedural safeguards.31 
 On the other hand, Justice Marshall, writing for the plurality, 
suggested that Florida create procedures resembling those used in 
competency to stand trial or civil commitment-type situations. 32 Be-
fore trial, individuals must be able to understand the nature of 
criminal proceedings against them, have a rational and factual un-
derstanding of those proceedings, and assist counsel in the defense.33 
Rather than dictate a possible standard as Justice Powell did, the 
plurality left the implementation of its opinion open to the states. 34 
This resulted in a montage of procedures without uniformity and 
without a standard due process for evaluating mentally incompetent 
death row inmates. 35 
 Reading the Ford opinion in line with earlier Supreme Court opin-
ions at least suggests the Court’s intended direction. Trop v. Dulles 
indicated that the concept behind the Eighth Amendment was “noth-
ing less than the dignity of man . . . . [It] must draw its meaning from 
                                                                                                                  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 408. 
 28. Id. at 409. 
 29. Id. at 422 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 30. Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 31. See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 15-16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 32. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 412. This level of sanity generally conforms to the Dusky 
standard promulgated by the Court for competency-to-stand trial. Dusky v. United States, 
362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
 33. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402. 
 34. Ford, 477 U.S. at 416-17. 
 35. In its conclusion to Ford, the Court simply stated, “[t]he Eighth Amendment pro-
hibits a State from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.” Id. at 
410. 
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the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society.”36 This statement, coupled with the open-ended invitation 
to the states to implement their own procedures, indicates flexibility 
in the process and the Court’s desire for states to continually assess 
needs and deficiencies in their own laws.  
 Although the Court left the standard and procedures open-ended, 
it clearly indicated that Florida’s procedures violated the Eighth 
Amendment in three ways: (1) by denying the prisoner a mechanism 
to challenge the findings and impeach the opinions of the governor-
appointed psychiatrists, (2) by placing the entire competency deter-
mination in the hands of the governor, and (3) by preventing the con-
demned from playing any relevant part in the quest for the truth.37 
The Florida Legislature had to act quickly to eliminate these blatant 
procedural flaws and prevent further constitutional violations. 38 
Hindsight, however, illuminates the imprecision and dangers result-
ing from the quick fix.39  
B.   Applying Atkins v. Virginia to Mental Competency Standards 
 After the plurality opinion in Ford,40 the Supreme Court, in Atkins 
v. Virginia, garnered six votes to decisively prohibit executions of the 
mentally retarded under the Eighth Amendment.41 Although the 
Court again left the task of developing procedures to enforce this 
prohibition to the states, 42 the Court’s rationale provides insight into 
drafting acceptable methods to prevent the State from executing the 
mentally ill.  
 The Court recognized that the mentally retarded often know the 
difference between right and wrong and seem superficially competent 
to stand trial, yet cannot provide meaningful assistance to their at-
torneys.43 Because of their impairments, the mentally retarded “have 
diminished capacities to understand and process information, to 
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, 
to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand 
                                                                                                                  
 36. 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). 
 37. Ford, 477 U.S. at 413-16. 
 38. See In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 518 So. 2d 256 
(Fla. 1987). 
 39. See, e.g., Sanchez-Velasco v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Corr., 287 F.3d 1015 (11th Cir. 
2002); Ferguson v. State, 789 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 2001); Provenzano v. State, 750 So. 2d 597 
(Fla. 1999); Carter v. State, 706 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1997); Medina v. State, 690 So. 2d 1241 
(Fla. 1997); Wuornos v. State, 676 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 1996).  
 40. Ford, 477 U.S. at 399. 
 41. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). For additional commentary on Atkins v. Virginia, see, James 
W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative Issues, 27 
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11 (2003); Note, Implementing Atkins, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 2565 (2003). 
 42. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317. 
 43. Id. at 318, 320. 
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the reactions of others.”44 The same is true for the mentally ill. In At-
kins, this inability to assist in one’s own defense categorically ex-
cluded the mentally retarded from execution.45 Yet, Florida does not 
require that the mentally ill have the ability to communicate with 
counsel.46  
 The Court also noted the contrast between the State and defense 
experts’ examinations. To determine whether Daryl Atkins qualified 
as mentally retarded, the defense’s forensic psychologist interviewed 
Atkins, members of Atkins’ family, and even deputies working in the 
jail where Atkins had lived for the preceding eighteen months.47 The 
defense psychologist also reviewed school and court records and ad-
ministered a standard intelligence test that showed Atkins’s IQ level 
to be fifty-nine.48 According to the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales 
test (WAIS-III), an IQ of less than seventy is considered mentally re-
tarded.49  
 The State’s expert witnesses testified that Atkins was not men-
tally retarded.50 They based their testimony on two interviews with 
Atkins, a brief review of his school records, and a few interviews with 
correctional staff.51 The State’s experts did not administer an intelli-
gence test, yet they concluded that Atkins was of “average intelli-
gence, at least.”52  
 The Court relied on the defense expert’s testimony to ban execu-
tion of the mentally ill. 53 In doing so, it introduced and accepted 
standardized measurement instruments in the field of psychology. 
Although the WAIS-III measures intelligence, numerous other scien-
tifically sanctioned instruments exist for psychological testing.54 
These tests include accurate provisions to detect malingering, or 
“faking.”55 
                                                                                                                  
 44. Id. at 318. 
 45. Id. at 320.  
 46. See FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (2002). 
 47. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.4. 
 48. Id. at 308-09. 
 49. Id. at 309 n.5. (citing B. SADOCK & V. SADOCK, COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF 
PSYCHIATRY 2952 (7th ed. 2000)). Only about one percent of the population has an IQ this 
low. Id. Dr. Nelson, the defense’s forensic psychologist, testified that in evaluating over 
forty capital defendants, “Atkins was only the second individual who met the criteria for 
mental retardation.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 50. Id. at 309. 
 51. Id. at 309 n.6. 
 52. Id. at 309 (citation omitted). 
 53. See id. 
 54. See Table 1, infra Part VI. 
 55. For example, decrements in the WMS-R concentration/attention index are atypi-
cal and signal the need for full assessment of malingering. Mark A. Small & Randy K. 
Otto, Evaluations of Competency to Be Executed: Legal Contours and Implications for As-
sessment, 18 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV . 146, 153 (1991). 
342  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:335 
 
 Experts inevitably disagree on the meaning of test results or 
evaluations on some occasions. However, the State’s experts who ex-
amined both Atkins and Ford based their opinions on considerably 
less evaluation and reached conclusions that not only contradicted 
those of the defense experts, but also were explicitly rejected by the 
Supreme Court. A standardized evaluation instrument would im-
prove and streamline the process by allowing the fact finder to focus 
on valid differences in opinion rather than inadequate evaluation 
techniques. 
III.   FLORIDA’S “STANDARD” FOR EVALUATING MENTAL COMPETENCY 
FOR EXECUTION 
A.   The Substantive Law and Procedures 
 Florida’s process does not contain a standardized evaluation in-
strument, nor does it incorporate the rationale in Atkins. Instead, 
Florida continues to use the approach suggested by Justice Powell’s 
concurrence in Ford v. Wainwright.56 This sixteen-year-old approach 
considers only the individual’s cognitive capacity for understanding 
the penalty and disregards the individual’s need to be able to com-
municate with his or her attorney.57 Florida continues to define in-
sanity as “lack[ing] the mental capacity to understand the fact of the 
impending execution and the reason for it.”58 
1.   Trying for a Hearing 
 In Florida’s current procedure, inmates, or people acting on their 
behalf, may raise issues of competency for execution only after the 
governor signs the death warrant.59 Once raised, the governor ap-
points a commission of three psychiatrists to examine the inmate and 
determine “whether he or she understands the nature and effect of 
the death penalty and why it is to be imposed upon him or her.”60 
 Prior to 1970, the commission of mental health evaluators had to 
include “two competent disinterested physicians.”61 The Florida legis-
lature has since removed the requirement that the psychiatrists be 
disinterested.62 Now the State appoints disinterested physicians only 
                                                                                                                  
 56. 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 57. See id. 
 58. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.811(b).  
 59. See Hall v. Moore, 792 So. 2d 447, 450 (Fla. 2001). 
 60. FLA. STAT. § 922.07(1) (2002). 
 61. Ch. 70-339, § 134, 1970 Laws of Fla. 1058, 1059 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 922.07(1) 
(2002)). 
 62. See FLA. STAT. § 922.07(1) (2002).  
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if the inmate ultimately obtains a hearing and then only if the judge 
thinks it necessary.63  
 The commission of the three governor-appointed psychiatrists 
must examine the inmate at the same time.64 The defense attorney 
and the state attorney may also attend.65 After receiving the commis-
sion’s report, the governor decides whether the person is mentally 
competent. 66 Florida’s governors are notorious for their “ghoulish ri-
valry” in support of the death penalty.67 Consequently, an individual 
must not only navigate the competency process, but the political one 
as well. Only after the governor’s decision may the inmate move for a 
stay of execution in the circuit court.68 The motion may contain the 
defense psychiatrist’s testimony as well as any other relevant evi-
dence.69  
 Since many death row inmates require pro bono services, 70 they 
typically have only one mental health expert.71 The judge, when 
evaluating a motion that could include three state expert opinions 
versus one defense expert, shall grant a stay of execution and may 
order further proceedings if he or she has “reasonable grounds” to be-
lieve that the prisoner is insane.72 The inherent danger exists that a 
                                                                                                                  
 63. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.812(c). For a look at the willingness of Florida’s mental health 
examiners to participate in competency hearings, see Mary Ann Deitchman, Self-Selection 
Factors and Willingness of Florida Mental Health Professionals to Participate in Compe-
tency for Execution Evaluations (1988) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Florida State University) 
(on file with the Florida State University Library). 
 64. § 922.07(1). For an explanation of problems associated with joint examinations, 
see, infra Part IV.B.1.b.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. § 922.07(2).  
 67. The Politics of Death, ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 1990, at 26. In Bob Martinez’s cam-
paign, he boasted, “I now have signed ninety death warrants in the state of Florida . . . .” 
Symposium, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due Process Su r-
vive the Perceived Political Pressure?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 246 n.28 (citing Richard 
Cohen, Playing Politics with the Death Penalty, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1990, at A19). In 
Florida Governor Bob Graham’s race for the United States Senate, he bragged about sign-
ing four death warrants between February and the election in November. Id. at 246. 
 68. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.811(d). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See generally Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense 
Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329 (1995). 
 71. Mental health experts face an interesting ethical dilemma in death penalty cases 
since they must take an oath to preserve life. For more information on this ethical di-
lemma, see Douglas Mossman, The Psychiatrist and Execution Competency: Fording Murky 
Ethical Waters, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1992); David L. Shapiro, Ethical Dilemmas for 
the Mental Health Professional: Issues Raised by Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 34 CAL. 
W. L. REV. 177 (1997); Donald H. Wallace, The Need to Commute the Death Sentence: Com-
petency for Execution and Ethical Dilemmas for Mental Health Professionals, 15 INT’L J.L. 
& PSYCHIATRY 317 (1992). 
 72. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.811(e). “Reasonable grounds” may exist when a defendant pre-
sents both an expert report that alleges he or she is incompetent and other corroborating 
evidence of strange behavior that creates a question of fact on the issue. Provenzano v. 
State, 751 So. 2d 37, 40 (Fla. 1999).  
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trial judge will summarily accept the multiple opinions of the State’s 
experts rather than the one presented by the defense.73 If the judge 
refuses to grant a hearing, the inmate never receives a full-scale de 
novo determination of competency that would allow the judge to 
evaluate all of the evidence.74  
2.   In the Event of a Hearing 
 Florida does not, as a matter of law, grant hearings to determine 
competency for execution even though the execution may be uncon-
stitutional. Medina v. State was the closest the Florida Supreme 
Court came to granting a hearing as a matter of law.75 In Medina, the 
court held that reports by two psychologists and one psychiatrist, 
which concluded that Medina was insane, met the “reasonable-
ground threshold” and required an evidentiary hearing.76 The impos-
sibility of psychiatric post-execution evaluations forecloses any fur-
ther constitutional challenges.  
 If the petitioner actually receives a hearing, he or she must prove 
incompetency by “clear and convincing” evidence.77 Although the 
hearings are technically de novo, the court is not bound by the rules 
of evidence.78 When presented with an issue of competency for execu-
tion, the judge may do one of three things: “(1) require the presence 
of the prisoner at the hearing; (2) appoint no more than 3 disinter-
ested mental health experts to examine the prisoner . . . ; or (3) enter 
such other orders as may be appropriate . . . .”79 Of the three, only 
appointing disinterested experts contains any substance. If the judge 
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the individual is incom-
petent, then the judge enters an order continuing the stay of execu-
tion until the individual is restored to sanity.80 
                                                                                                                  
 73. See Medina v. State, 690 So. 2d 1241, 1254 (Fla. 1997) (Anstead, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part). Although Florida created the Capital Collateral Representative 
(CCR), these agencies have limited funding and must serve all 334 of Florida’s death row 
inmates. Thus, it is far more likely that the defendant’s odds are three-to-one. In Proven-
zano v. State, the defense was concerned not only with prejudice, but with even being able 
to present defense expert testimony since the expert was in Wyoming and could not testify 
on the short notice provided by the court. 750 So. 2d 597, 599-601 (Fla. 1999). 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. at 1242.  
 76. Id. at 1246. 
 77. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.812(e). 
 78. Id. at 3.812(d). 
 79. Id. at 3.812(c).  
 80. Although much controversy exists over the administration of antipsychotic medi-
cation to render an inmate competent for execution, a full discussion is beyond the scope of 
this Comment. The Eighth Circuit recently held that the Constitution does not forbid a 
state to force a psychotic death row inmate to take drugs making him sane for execution. 
Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Ironically, the medica-
tion, according to the test in United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 567 (8th Cir. 2002), va-
cated by  123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003), remained in the inmate’s “best medical interest” once an 
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 All of Florida’s procedures seem targeted toward expediting com-
petency cases to avoid the risk of delay and false claims. However, 
history suggests that a perception of increasing delay and false 
claims is inaccurate.81 Even during the period surrounding the high-
profile case of Ford v. Wainwright, fewer than five percent of Flor-
ida’s death row inmates claimed mental incapacity.82  
 A more comprehensive system of evaluating mental health that 
includes standardized procedures and a threshold showing of incom-
petency before reaching a hearing could retain expediency without 
compromising due process. This revamped system would require a 
psychiatrist’s report certifying that, in his or her expert opinion, the 
inmate would not meet the competency test. Only upon receipt of ex-
pert evidence would the issue go to a full competency assessment 
procedure. Three neutral psychiatrists would then examine the in-
mate. Their reports, in addition to other opinions the defense or 
State wished to include, would go to a hearing. This would effectively 
avoid the prolonged process of going through the governor, and would 
require specific findings up front to reach a more in-depth analysis.83 
B.   Flaws in Florida’s Process 
 Reform begins with an understanding of how the present system 
may run awry. Accordingly, four impediments to accurate determina-
tions of competency exist in Florida’s procedures: (1) no assessment 
of assistance capabilities to ensure that prisoners could assist coun-
sel in their own defense by communicating any fact that would make 
their execution improper or unlawful; (2) no standardized procedure 
for psychiatrists to follow when evaluating competency for execution; 
(3) no adherence to the rules of evidence, including hearsay; and fi-
nally, (4) an inmate’s burden to prove insanity by clear and convinc-
ing evidence is too high and should remain consistent with the bur-
den of proving competency to stand trial. 
1.   Communication with Counsel 
 First, Florida’s statute fails to include an assistance prong to de-
termine whether the inmate can communicate with counsel. 84 This 
                                                                                                                  
execution date was set. For more information on the ethics of administering antipsychotic 
drugs in death penalty cases, see Michael D. Grabo & Michael Sapoznikow, The Ethical D i-
lemma of Involuntary Medication in Death Penalty Cases, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795 
(2002).  
 81. See Paul F. Enzinna & Jana L. Gill, Capital Punishment and the Incompetent: 
Procedures for Determining Competency to Be Executed After Ford v. Wainwright, 41 FLA. 
L. REV. 115, 129 (1989). 
 82. Id.  
 83. See id. 
 84. See FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (2002). 
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becomes particularly important in light of numerous procedural er-
rors in death penalty proceedings. A national study conducted by Co-
lumbia University found, based on direct appeals, post-conviction re-
views, and federal habeas corpus petitions, that Florida’s prejudicial 
error rate in death penalty cases is seventy-three percent.85 An incom-
plete list from 1973 to 2000 revealed that twenty-four cases were re-
examined due to ineffective counsel. 86 Nine cases were reevaluated 
because the State suppressed crucial evidence.87 In light of these sta-
tistics, by not including an evaluation of the inmate’s ability to con-
sult with counsel, the State takes advantage of the inmate’s mental 
incompetency to foreclose his or her final right to challenge the exe-
cution.  
 The argument arises that, since post-conviction proceedings afford 
more procedural safeguards, the State can safely satisfy due process 
concerns with a quick checklist. In the post-conviction process, how-
ever, an individual receives a competency hearing only “when there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that a capital defendant is incom-
petent to proceed in postconviction proceedings in which factual mat-
ters are at issue, the development or resolution of which require the 
defendant’s input.”88 Ironically, an inmate cannot raise a factual is-
sue if he or she is not competent. Thus, the circularity of the process 
precludes effective review at this stage.  
 An individual may be competent for execution if he or she under-
stands the facts and reasons for the impending execution. However, 
since the current standard does not require sufficient capacity to 
consult with an attorney, the inmate may be unable to raise a genu-
                                                                                                                  
 85. JAMES S.  LIEBMAN ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM EDUCATION FUND, A 
BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995, app. A, at A34 (June 2002), 
available at http://justice.policy.net/cjedfund/jpreport/florida.pdf.   
 86. Id. at app. C, C-12 to C-16, available at http://justice.policy.net/cjedfund/jpr 
port/liebapp5.pdf; see also Clark v. State, 690 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1997); Rose v. State, 675 
So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1996); State v. Gunsby, 670 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1996); Hildwin v. Dugger, 654 
So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1995); Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 1994); Deaton v. 
Dugger, 635 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1993); Garcia v. State, 622 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1993); Heiney v. 
State, 620 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1993); Hudson v. State, 614 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1993); Phillips v. 
State, 608 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1992); Bates v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1992); Mitchell v. 
State, 595 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 1992); State v. Lara, 581 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1991); Stevens v. 
State, 552 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1989); Bassett v. State, 541 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1989); State v. Mi-
chael, 530 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1988); Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 1986); 
Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1985); Dougan v. Wainwright, 448 So. 2d 1005 
(Fla. 1984); Vaught v. State, 442 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1983); Williams v. State, 438 So. 2d 781 
(Fla. 1983); Holmes v. State, 429 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1983); Leduc v. State, 415 So. 2d 721 
(Fla. 1982).  
 87. LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 85, at app. C, C-12 to C-15, available at 
http://justice.policy.net/cjedfund/jpreport/liebapp5.pdf; see also Young v. State, 739 So. 2d 
553 (Fla. 1999); Garcia v. State, 622 So. 2d 1325 (Fla. 1993); Gorham v. State, 597 So. 2d 
782 (Fla. 1992); Roman v. State, 528 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1988); Arango v. State 497 So. 2d 
1161 (Fla. 1986); Arango v. State, 467 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1985).  
 88. Carter v. State, 706 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. 1997). 
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ine issue to reach a post-conviction proceeding.89 Consider the follow-
ing analogy: If the State required a child with learning disabilities to 
read before qualifying for help, then the child may never receive that 
help. Likewise, the inmate must first have the capacity to recognize 
and communicate new facts or issues to qualify for a post-conviction 
competency hearing.  
 Both the common law and Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent in 
Solesbee v. Balkcom, recognized the need for an assistance compo-
nent in determinations of competency.90 Sir John Hawles, Hale, 
Hawkins, and Blackstone noted that “‘were [the inmate] of sound 
memory, he might allege somewhat’ to save himself from doom.”91 As 
Justice Frankfurter considered these writings in Solesbee, he con-
cluded: 
It is not an idle fancy that one under sentence of death ought not, 
by becoming non compos, be denied the means to “allege some-
what” that might free him. Such an opportunity may save life, as 
the last minute applications to this Court from time to time and 
not always without success amply attest.92 
 These last minute applications to the Supreme Court suggest that 
two things happen with frequency once the governor signs a death 
warrant: (1) new or suppressed evidence appears and (2) the inmate 
may retain new counsel.93 New counsel is often state-appointed, may 
be less experienced in handling death penalty cases, 94 and would be 
less knowledgeable about the specific case.95 When the governor signs 
a death warrant, he or she starts the clock ticking. A new attorney 
faces mountains of paper and boxes of files. Thus, the burden to point 
out the significance of new material falls partly on the inmate. 
 Pedro Medina, the defendant in Medina v. State, serves as an ex-
ample of the problems prisoners face when new or, as in his case, 
suppressed evidence arises after trial. 96 Medina was a nineteen-year-
old inmate of a Cuban mental asylum who was taken from the asy-
                                                                                                                  
 89. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.811. 
 90. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 19 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. (quoting writings of Hawles, Hale, Hawkins, and Blackstone). 
 92. Id. at 19-20. 
 93. See, e.g., Banks v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1511 (2003) (staying execution). Banks 
came within ten minutes of execution before the Supreme Court granted him a stay based 
on an allegation that prosecutors withheld evidence and two witnesses lied on the stand. 
Medina v. State, 690 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1997) (hearing testimony on newly discovered evi-
dence); James Kimberly, Victim’s Family Stunned by Stay in Banks Case, HOUSTON 
CHRON., Mar. 14, 2003, available at 2003 WL 3244083. For additional information on 
close-call executions, see MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN: THE NEAR-EXECUTION 
OF EARL WASHINGTON, JR. (2003). 
 94. Capital Collateral Representative (CCR) is largely underfunded. As a result, the 
agency often hires young attorneys who must go up against experienced state attorneys.  
 95. See FLA. STAT. § 922.07(1) (2002) (allowing new counsel to be appointed). 
 96. See 690 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1997). 
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lum and shipped to the United States in the 1980 Mariel boat lift. 97 
Two years later, Florida charged Medina with murder.98 One psy-
chiatrist and two psychologists established that Medina suffered 
from organic brain damage, schizophrenia, or a major depressive dis-
order categorized as both long-standing and recurrent.99 Only the 
psychiatrist believed that Medina could be rehabilitated if “stabilized 
by proper medication and therapy.”100 Unlike Ford, who developed his 
mental illness after being imprisoned,101 Medina had a history of se-
rious, and often crippling, mental illness. 102 He exhibited hallmark 
characterizations of schizophrenia that included major disturbances 
in thought content and involved multiple, fragmented, and bizarre 
delusions. 103  
 The Florida Supreme Court, in its majority opinion reviewing Me-
dina’s request for an evidentiary hearing on competency for execu-
tion, did not include a single fact about his history of mental ill-
ness.104 In denying post-conviction relief, the majority also failed to 
mention that the State indisputably “possessed evidence that some-
one else other than Medina killed the victim . . . and failed to disclose 
that evidence to the defendant.”105 A dissent and concurrence by Jus-
tice Anstead discussed not only Medina’s history of mental illness, 
but also the newly furnished materials provided by the State. 106 
These materials implicated someone else in the murder and recog-
nized that not even the victim’s daughters believed Medina killed 
their mother.107 In fact, the daughters testified in Medina’s favor.108  
 Had Medina been competent, might he have alleged something 
regarding this new evidence to show not only that he did not deserve 
the death penalty but that he was innocent? The question remains 
unanswered. The State executed Medina on March 25, 1997.109  
 Including the ability to assist counsel as a component of mental 
competency determinations is a necessary step toward providing 
                                                                                                                  
 97. Id. at 1250. For information on the Mariel boat lift, see supra note 11. 
 98. Medina, 690 So. 2d at 1250. 
 99. Id. at 1251. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 402 (1986). 
 102. Medina, 690 So. 2d at 1251. 
 103. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-III-R) 188 (3d ed. rev. 1987). 
 104. See Medina, 690 So. 2d at 1250 (Anstead, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). 
 105. Id. at 1252. 
 106. Id. at 1250-53. 
 107. Id. at 1251-52. 
 108. Id. at 1251. 
 109. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., Execution List, 1976-Present, at http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/ 
deathrow/execlist.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003). 
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meaningful due process before executions. 110 In its examinations, 
Florida should inquire whether an inmate lacks either (1) the capac-
ity to recognize or understand any fact that would make punishment 
by death unjust or unlawful, or (2) the ability to communicate this in-
formation to counsel. This component would bolster the constitution-
ality of the punishment and give meaning to the post-conviction 
process by removing its circularity.111 
2.   Arbitrary Psychiatrist Determinations 
 In addition to its minimal competency standards, Florida lacks a 
standardized procedure for expert examiners to follow in determining 
competency for execution.112 Florida minutely details its execution 
day procedures to ensure “that the salt-free, hypoallergenic electri-
cally-conductive gel is applied to the crown of the shaven head and 
calf of the right leg in a total application of approximately 4 
ounces.”113 Yet, the competency standard is vague and asks only 
whether the inmate “understands the nature and effect of the death 
penalty and why it is to be imposed upon him or her.”114 The ambigu-
ity of the words “understands” and “nature . . . of the death penalty” 
cause particular problems for examiners. 115 
(a)   Ambiguity Within the Definition 
 “Understand” is difficult to define in the competency context. 116 
Does it require an intellectual understanding of impending death, or 
does it also require some sort of emotional appreciation for it?117 In a 
sense, the answer depends on the rationale behind capital punish-
ment.118 In Atkins v. Virginia, the United States Supreme Court fo-
cused on retribution and deterrence as the primary rationales sup-
porting the death penalty.119  
 Concentrating only on the Supreme Court’s reasoning, a “retribu-
tionist” would advocate an intellectual and emotional understanding 
                                                                                                                  
 110. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL 
HEALTH STANDARDS 290 (1989). 
 111. See id. 
 112. See FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (2002) (providing no procedure for experts to follow). 
 113. Provenzano v. State, 739 So. 2d 1150, 1158 (Fla. 1999) (Appendix on Execution 
Day Procedures Effective for Executions After April 16, 1997). 
 114. FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (2002). 
 115. See id. 
 116. Michael L. Radelet & George W. Barnard, Ethics and the Psychiatric Determina-
tion of Competency to Be Executed, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 37, 42 (1986).  
 117. Enzinna & Gill, supra note 81, at 117-18 n.14. 
 118. Id. 
 119. 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). 
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of both the crime and the impending punishment.120 This would force 
individuals to recognize their “guilt” and “moral indiscretions.”121 
When an inmate’s understanding of the death penalty is so mistaken 
that the individual believes, as Ford did, that the state could never 
impose the death penalty because the individual could manipulate 
the governor through “mind control,” then the inmate lacks the req-
uisite understanding.122 The Atkins decision noted that the main as-
pect of retribution depended on culpability.123 Thus, since the men-
tally retarded and the mentally ill are less culpable, the Supreme 
Court reasoned that this decreased the retribution “value.”124 
 A similar rationale applies to deterrence. In Atkins, the Court de-
cided that the same cognitive difficulties that made the mentally re-
tarded less morally culpable also made it less likely that they could 
adequately process the information of impending execution and con-
trol their behavior based on such information.125 The same reasoning 
applies to the mentally ill.126 When interpreting the term “under-
standing,” examiners must keep these ends in mind. Full apprecia-
tion of the crime prior to death would be necessary under either the 
deterrence or retribution rationale.127 
 Regardless of rationale, if “understand” merely means that the 
inmate should possess a bare mental awareness of execution, then 
many severely mentally ill people will be deemed competent. A para-
noid schizophrenic may not outwardly display functional inabilities 
and may be able to interact with others. 128 This same schizophrenic 
may even be able to describe the process of execution, but would not 
show any emotional reaction to facing execution.129 It would be akin 
to waking up and thinking, “Today I will wash my face, brush my 
                                                                                                                  
 120. See Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry, 
14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35, 52-54 (1986). 
 121. See id. 
 122. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 403 (1986). 
 123. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Id. at 320; see also Kristen F. Grunewald, Note, Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 
(2002), 15 CAP. DEF. J. 117, 119 (2002). 
 126. Deterrence as a rationale applies less to people like Medina whose illness began 
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concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating Medina had a long history of mental ill-
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 127. See Enzinna & Gill, supra note 81, at 118 n.14. 
 128. Schizophrenia has both an active and regressive phase. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC 
ASSOCIATION, supra note 103, at 187. Its essential feature is the presence of psychotic 
symptoms during the active phase and at some point during this active phase includes “de-
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thought.” Id. Delusions often involve “the belief that others are spying on, spreading false 
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 129. Enzinna & Gill, supra note 81, at 118 n.14. 
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teeth, and be executed.” A prisoner should possess a mental ability 
greater than a simple cognitive acknowledgement of his or her fate.130  
 Although practical difficulties arise in precisely defining the term 
“understanding” within different circumstances, the ambiguity of the 
word and the range of possible responses indicate the critical need 
for a standardized mechanism of evaluation. Similar impediments 
arise in interpreting “nature of the penalty.” Since society does not 
agree on what the phrase means in the larger context of the death 
penalty’s rationale, experts cannot look to a uniform societal justifi-
cation for information on how to apply the standard.131  
(b)   Rationality Element 
 Recently, the Florida Supreme Court decided that the need for an 
inmate to “have the mental capacity to understand the fact of the 
impending execution and reason for it” was a “rationality element.” 
132 This designation was necessary to make Florida’s Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.811 constitutional. The rationality element requires that 
an inmate be given the opportunity to cross-examine psychiatrists 
concerning the “rational appreciation of the connection between [the 
person’s] crime and the punishment [the person] is to receive.”133 
Webster’s defines rational as “able to reason” or “sensible.”134 A logi-
cal response from a sensible or reasonable person facing death would 
be an emotional reaction. Thus, by requiring a rational connection, 
the court seemed to indicate that the prisoner should exhibit both an 
intellectual understanding of the death penalty and an emotional re-
sponse to his or her impending execution.  
 Although the Florida Supreme Court read the rationality element 
into the existing statutory framework, in its opinion, the court admit-
ted that the element is a “limited one.”135 The court neglected to de-
fine what would actually constitute a rational connection and pro-
vided no additional guidance for examiners. Therefore, instead of 
bolstering the constitutionality of the process, the court left examin-
ing experts to implement its decision completely unaided.  
 A standardized evaluation process would eliminate the need for 
judges to sift through the differences in expert evaluators’ opinions to 
ascertain which differences simply resulted from less time spent with 
the inmate, fewer questions asked, and less research conducted. 
                                                                                                                  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 117 n.14 (citing Radelet & Barnard, supra note 116, at 37, 42). Societal dis-
agreement may stem from the lack of statistical data supporting any economic or dete r-
rence rationale for the death penalty.  
 132. Provenzano v. State, 750 So. 2d 597, 602 (Fla. 1999). 
 133. Id. at 602-03. 
 134. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 619 (2d Concise ed. 1982). 
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Since experts inevitably disagree at some level, minimizing actual 
disputes over implementation of the statute would bolster accuracy 
and expend less judicial resources. 136 The same mental health experts 
do not evaluate each claim. Consequently, one prisoner may be de-
clared incompetent, while another, perhaps with an identical illness, 
would be considered competent simply because of varying examina-
tion methods. 137  
 If Florida’s procedure provided experts with a basic methodology 
for conducting mental competency evaluations, then the experts 
could present the court with specific disagreements over certain ar-
eas.138 This would decrease variations in opinion due to an insuffi-
cient understanding of the individual and assure the judge that the 
psychiatrist based his or her opinion on a solid foundation of uniform 
information.  
3.   Lenient “Rules” of Evidence 
 Florida’s process for evaluating competency for execution is also 
undermined by the lack of standards for admitting evidence in com-
petency hearings. Florida allows courts to haphazardly apply the 
rules of evidence in these hearings, if it decides to apply them at 
all. 139 According to Florida’s Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts 
“may admit such evidence as the court deems relevant to the issues, 
including but not limited to the reports of expert witnesses, and the 
court shall not be strictly bound by the rules of evidence.”140  
 Although suspension of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, 
which assures confidentiality between psychotherapists and patients 
within the scope of their relationship, would be necessary to admit 
expert evidence, disposing of all evidentiary formalities and rules 
undermines the fairness of the proceedings.141 This casual approach 
to evidentiary standards creates problems by (1) allowing experts to 
rely on unscientifically validated methods to reach their competency 
conclusions, and (2) permitting hearsay in competency hearings.  
                                                                                                                  
 136. See Enzinna & Gill, supra note 81, at 118 n.14; see also Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari at 39, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (No. 85-5524) (explaining the differ-
ences of expert opinion over the proper standard to employ when evaluating Ford). 
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 138. See Bruce Ebert, Competency to Be Executed: A Proposed Instrument to Evaluate 
an Inmate’s Level of Competency in Light of the Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against the 
Execution of the Presently Insane, 25 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 46-50 (2001). 
 139. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.812(d). 
 140. Id. (emphasis added). 
 141. See FLA. STAT. § 90.503 (2002). 
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(a)   Unscientifically Validated Methods 
 If enforced, Florida’s Evidence Code already contains a safeguard 
to prevent expert testimony based on unreliable methodology.142 
Without this safeguard, experts may conduct evaluations using un-
acceptable testing instruments that do not contain the high degree of 
reliability required by the Evidence Code.143  
 The Florida Supreme Court, in Stokes v. State,144 adopted the 
“Frye test” to determine the admissibility of testimony based on sci-
entific principles. The Frye test, established by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Frye v. 
United States, requires that an underlying scientific principle be 
“sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs.”145 Not only must the methodol-
ogy be scientifically valid, the procedures used in administering the 
instrument to the individual must be generally accepted in the psy-
chiatric community.146 Thus, a psychiatrist’s opinion on competence 
is admissible only when the underlying examination instrument is 
generally accepted in the field of psychiatry.147  
 A court should not admit an expert’s opinion on competency 
unless the court determines that the expert reliably applied valid 
clinical instruments and methods. 148 The circuit court should not 
have to bear the additional burden of sorting through numerous 
mental health testing instruments to determine validity and reliabil-
ity.149 Conversely, the inmate should also be able to rely on the valid-
ity of testing instruments offered into evidence both for and against 
him or her. 
(b)   Hearsay 
 Hearsay also becomes an issue when a court does not enforce the 
rules of evidence.150 Competency for execution hearings present a 
unique risk of reliance on hearsay because of the impossibility of elic-
iting first hand testimony from some neighboring death row inmates. 
                                                                                                                  
 142. FLA. STAT. § 90.704 (2002) (allowing experts to base opinion testimony on facts or 
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354  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:335 
 
These inmates may be executed before the court or attorneys realize 
that they need the inmate’s testimony. Without the executed in-
mate’s testimony, an individual may face a one-sided accusation by a 
state-interested prison guard who claims to have overheard state-
ments between the two inmates. 
 This situation arose in Medina v. State where a correctional offi-
cer claimed that he overheard Medina telling another death row in-
mate that his attorney instructed him to “act crazy.”151 The neighbor-
ing inmate’s execution was scheduled for four days after the officer 
allegedly overheard the conversation.152 Although Medina’s counsel 
took the neighboring inmate’s deposition before the inmate was exe-
cuted,153 this may not always be possible.  
 Three levels of hearsay and all of its inherent dangers exist in the 
Medina situation: (1) an attorney makes a statement to his client, (2) 
the client makes a statement to another death row inmate concern-
ing the first statement, and (3) the correctional officer claims to 
overhear this second interaction.154 In Medina, if the inmate had not 
been deposed, a “catch-22” situation would have arisen. The correc-
tional officer could testify against the inmate, but the inmate’s attor-
ney, as the alleged declarant, could do very little in light of the attor-
ney-client privilege unless the inmate was of sound mind to waive 
the privilege.155 In Medina, because the Florida Evidence Code did 
not apply, the court accepted the officer’s hearsay affidavit.156 The 
court then took it upon itself to waive the attorney-client privilege 
even though the privilege is not for the court to waive.157  
 Since the officer in a Medina-type situation is a second-hand party 
to the information, the court would typically exclude his or her testi-
mony as hearsay.158 Even if the officer’s statement fell within a hear-
say exception or exclusion,159 the statement’s probative value might 
be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, which 
would make the testimony inadmissible.160 Although the dangers of 
admitting inadmissible evidence are less in a bench trial than a jury 
trial, judges are entitled to rely on expert testimony based on trust-
worthy methods and first hand testimony. Turning the entire body of 
                                                                                                                  
 151. Medina v. State, 690 So. 2d 1241, 1246 (Fla. 1997). 
 152. Id. at 1246 n.5. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Although the danger was apparent in Medina’s case, the Florida Supreme Court 
expressly authorized Medina’s counsel to testify under oath at the evidentiary hearing. See 
id. at 1246. 
 155. See FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (2002). 
 156. See Medina, 690 So. 2d at 1246. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See FLA. STAT. § 90.801 (2002). 
 159. See id. § 90.804. 
 160. See id. § 90.403. 
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evidence into a gray area undermines due process and procedural 
fairness. The result produces more confusion than reliability.  
 The best answer is to suspend only the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.161 Due to the unique circumstances of competency for exe-
cution hearings, a residual “catch-all” exception, akin to Rule 807 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence,162 should be included in Florida’s com-
petency statute. This exception to the hearsay rule, like the federal 
one, would allow courts to admit evidence having circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness if the court determines that: 
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered 
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through 
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and 
the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the 
statement of evidence.163  
The proponent of the otherwise inadmissible evidence must notify 
the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the hearing.164 This solu-
tion, which increases procedural safeguards, would bolster the reli-
ability of the evidence, and consequently, the accuracy of competency 
determinations.  
4.   Excessive Burden of Proof 
 The fourth procedural inadequacy in the current system concerns 
the high burden of proof placed on the inmate.165 Given that the 
courts determined the inmate competent to stand trial at one time, it 
is fair to allocate the burden of proof to the inmate to demonstrate 
the contrary.166 Florida places the burden of proof on the inmate to 
prove incompetency for execution by “clear and convincing evi-
dence.”167  
 In Cooper v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court unanimously held 
that requiring a criminal defendant to prove incompetence to stand 
trial by clear and convincing evidence violated the Due Process 
Clause.168 The mentally incompetent have a right not to stand  
                                                                                                                  
 161. Id. § 90.503. 
 162. FED. R. EVID. 807. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.812(e). 
 166. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 425-26 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring); State 
v. Harris, 789 P.2d 60, 68-69 (Wash. 1990); see also James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, 
Unfit to Live, Unfit to Die: Incompetency for Execution Under Modern Death Penalty Legis-
lation, 33 CRIM. L. BULL. 107, 134 (1997). 
 167. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.812(e); see also Provenzano v. State, 750 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1999) 
(claiming that the clear and convincing evidence standard does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 168. 517 U.S. 348, 362 (1996). 
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trial. 169 The clear and convincing standard allowed “the State to put 
to trial a defendant who is more likely than not incompetent . . . .”170 
The Florida Supreme Court summarily dismissed a challenge to Flor-
ida’s burden of proof in Medina v. State by citing the State’s substan-
tial interest in competency for execution.171 The court quoted Justice 
Powell’s concurring opinion in the earlier case of Ford v. Wain-
wright;172 however its only attempt to distinguish Cooper was a short 
statement that the issue in that case involved competency to stand 
trial which was “clearly different from a determination of sanity to be 
executed.”173 
 In Medina, the Florida Supreme Court failed to recognize the 
sweeping language used in Cooper that encompassed not just compe-
tency to stand trial, but all “cases in which competence is at issue.”174 
The United States Supreme Court assumed that “questions of compe-
tence will arise in a range of cases.”175 In hearings on competency for 
execution, the State’s interests are protected by requiring the inmate 
to bear the burden of proof and by the threshold showing of incompe-
tency needed to obtain a hearing.176 Conversely, the “prisoner’s [life] 
interest in avoiding an erroneous determination” of competency for 
execution “is very great.”177  
 Similar policy reasons apply to both competency to stand trial and 
competency for execution. The State may violate the Constitution in 
both instances. Executing the mentally ill violates the Eighth 
Amendment just as trying the incompetent defendant violates the 
Due Process Clause.178 Since respective interests and policy reasons 
are similar for both, the standard for competency to be executed 
should also be a preponderance of the evidence. 
IV.   A STANDARD SOLUTION WITH SUBSTANCE 
 Florida’s new statute and procedure should incorporate these les-
sons from the past sixteen years and seek to remedy the current 
flaws. Two existing standards provide guidance for creating a worka-
ble ideal standard for Florida: (1) the American Bar Association 
standard and (2) Florida’s current standard for competency to stand 
trial. 
                                                                                                                  
 169. Id. at 369. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Medina v. State, 690 So. 2d 1241, 1247 (Fla. 1997). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Cooper, 517 U.S. at 366. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See id.; Martin v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp. 1523, 1559 (S.D. Fla. 1988). 
 177. Martin, 686 F. Supp. at 1559. 
 178. Acker & Lanier, supra note 166, at 135. 
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A.   Statutory Models 
1.   American Bar Association Standard 
 In 1989, the American Bar Association (ABA) published a book of 
criminal justice mental health standards. 179 In promulgating a stan-
dard for mentally incompetent death row inmates, the authors ad-
dressed the concern that individuals should not be executed when 
they cannot understand the nature of the proceedings or the penalty 
imposed.180 The authors also included a component to ensure that an 
inmate can communicate information that might be exculpatory or 
mitigating to his or her attorney.181 This concern parallels that of 
Justice Frankfurter in Solesbee v. Balkcom.182 The standard reads: 
(b) A convict is incompetent to be executed if, as a result of mental 
illness or mental retardation, the convict cannot understand the 
nature of the pending proceedings, what he or she was tried for, 
the reason for the punishment, or the nature of the punishment. A 
convict is also incompetent if, as a result of mental illness or men-
tal retardation, the convict lacks sufficient capacity to recognize or 
understand any fact which might exist which would make the pun-
ishment unjust or unlawful, or lacks the ability to convey such in-
formation to counsel or to the court.183  
 The ABA’s recommendations adopt an intermediate position be-
tween Florida’s current competency for execution and competency to 
stand trial standards.184 The recommendations require several proce-
dures: (1) a threshold conclusion by the court to find “reasonable 
cause” of incompetency in the petition before ordering an evalua-
tion,185 (2) appointment of counsel and mental health professionals 
for indigent inmates at the State’s expense,186 (3) permission for any 
interested party to petition the court for a competency evaluation,187 
and (4) placement of the burden of proof on the prisoner to show in-
competence by a preponderance of the evidence.188 These points of 
procedure and the ABA standard provide a solid starting point for 
                                                                                                                  
 179. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., supra note 110. For a commentary on 
the ABA Criminal Justice Standards, see Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Report Regard-
ing Implementation of the American Bar Association’s Recommendations and Resolutions 
Concerning the Death Penalty and Calling for a Moratorium on Executions, 4 GEO. J. ON 
FIGHTING POVERTY 3 (1996).  
 180. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., supra note 110, at 290. 
 181. Id. at 293-94. 
 182. 339 U.S. 9, 19-20 (1950) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting); see also supra Part III.B.1. 
 183. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., supra note 110, at 290. 
 184. See FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (2002); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.211. 
 185. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., supra note 110, at 293-94. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. Both the standard for competency to stand trial and the ABA standards de-
crease the burden of proof. 
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Florida’s standards. However, the ABA standard does not address 
evidentiary concerns or provide guidance to experts in conducting 
examinations.  
2.   Florida’s Standard for Competency to Stand Trial 
 Florida’s standard governing competency to stand trial should 
supplement the ABA standard. Unlike Ford v. Wainwright,189 which 
left procedures for determining competency for execution to the 
states, the Supreme Court, in Dusky v. United States, mandated a 
specific and useful standard for competency to stand trial. 190 In 
Dusky, the Court held that “the ‘test must be whether he has suffi-
cient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable de-
gree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as 
well as [a] factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’”191 
This standard ensures that a person is able to both communicate 
with an attorney and understand the nature of the proceedings in a 
rational and intellectual sense.192 Florida codified the Dusky standard 
in its Rules of Criminal Procedure, and even set forth considerations 
and factors to aid experts in evaluating competency to stand trial. 193 
 In considering competence to proceed, Florida’s rules require ex-
perts to consider and report on the defendant’s capacity to: (1) “ap-
preciate the charges or allegations . . . ;” (2) “appreciate the range 
and nature of possible penalties, if applicable, that may be imposed 
. . . ;” (3) “understand the adversary nature of the legal process;” (4) 
“disclose to counsel facts pertinent to the proceedings at issue;” (5) 
“manifest appropriate courtroom behavior;” and (6) “testify rele-
vantly.”194 Experts may also include anything else they consider rele-
vant.195 Additionally, the rules direct experts to report on the kind of 
mental illness or retardation, appropriate treatments, availability of 
those treatments, and the likelihood and time frame of restoring the 
defendant’s competence.196 Expert reports must include (1) the “mat-
ters referred for evaluation;” (2) a description and purpose of the 
techniques, tests, and procedures used in examination; (3) clinical 
observations, findings, and opinions or instances in which the expert 
could not state an opinion; and finally, (4) the sources used for infor-
mation as well as the factual basis for the conclusions.197 When com-
                                                                                                                  
 189. 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
 190. 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
 191. Id. (quoting the Solicitor General). 
 192. A rational response would include an emotional connection since a rational person 
facing death would, most likely, exhibit some sort of emotional response. 
 193. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.211. 
 194. Id. at 3.211(a)(2)(A).  
 195. Id. at 3.211(a)(2)(B). 
 196. Id. at 3.211(b). 
 197. Id. at 3.211(d). 
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bined with the ABA standard, these substantial procedures and 
methods for competency to stand trial provide a suitable framework 
for clarifying and defining competency for execution. 
 With some adjustments, Florida could easily transition from its 
current competency for execution standard to procedures akin to the 
well-defined procedures for determining competence to stand trial. 
Rules 3.811 and 3.812 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure al-
ready provide a de novo evidentiary hearing when “reasonable 
grounds” showing insanity exist. Rule 3.210(b), governing compe-
tency to stand trial, is almost identical and reads: 
If, at any material stage of a criminal proceeding, the court of its 
own motion, or on motion of counsel for the defendant or for the 
state, has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is not 
mentally competent to proceed, the court shall immediately enter 
its order setting a time for a hearing to determine the defendant’s 
mental condition . . . .198 
 According to Justice Anstead, the Florida Supreme Court and the 
district courts consistently interpreted Rule 3.210(b) to require com-
petency hearings based on a broad array of evidence that might sug-
gest “reasonable grounds to believe that [a defendant] might be in-
competent.”199 In the past, these grounds ranged from a defendant’s 
refusal to cooperate with his or her attorney and accept favorable 
agreements, to cases that actually involved long histories of mental 
illness. 200  
3.   The Ideal Florida Statute and Rules of Criminal Procedure 
 The ideal statute seeks to remedy past statutory and procedural 
flaws and to ensure that psychiatrists apply the same basic proce-
dures to every inmate evaluated. Accordingly, the ideal statute 
should read:  
922.07 Proceedings when a person under sentence of death ap-
pears to be insane.201 
 
(1) When the Governor receives certification from a psychiatrist 
that a person under sentence of death may be insane, the Governor 
shall stay the execution of the sentence and appoint a commission 
of three disinterested psychiatrists to examine the inmate to help 
                                                                                                                  
 198. Id. at 3.210(b). 
 199. Medina v. State, 690 So. 2d 1241, 1253 (Fla. 1997) (Anstead, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part) (quoting Nowitzke v. State, 572 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. 1990)). 
 200. Id.; see also Hill v. State, 473 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1985); Scott v. State, 420 So. 2d 
595 (Fla. 1982) (discussing grounds where the defendant refused to cooperate with coun-
sel). 
 201. Much of the language in this proposed statute is derived from the current statute . 
See FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (2002). 
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determine if the inmate is incompetent to be executed. If the in-
mate is indigent and does not have a psychiatrist for either the ini-
tial certification or the post-certification process, one shall be ap-
pointed upon request pursuant to Florida Statute section 916.115. 
The commission’s determination shall be conducted in accordance 
with Florida’s Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the results shall 
be included in a final report. To the extent the report complies 
with evidentiary rules in the Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.812, it 
shall be submitted as evidence in the hearing on competency for 
execution. Hearings shall be granted upon proper initial certifica-
tion from the psychiatrist and motion of the court in accordance 
with Florida’s Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.811. 
(2) An inmate is incompetent to be executed if: 
(a) as a result of mental illness or mental retardation, the inmate 
does not have sufficient present ability to understand, with a rea-
sonable degree of rational and factual understanding, the nature of 
the pending proceedings, what he or she was tried for, the reason 
for the punishment, or the nature of the punishment; or  
(b) as a result of mental illness or mental retardation, the inmate 
lacks sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a rea-
sonable degree of rational and factual understanding, or if the in-
mate cannot recognize or understand any fact which might exist 
which would make the punishment unjust or unlawful, or lacks the 
ability to convey such information to counsel or to the court. 
(3) If the court decides that the inmate does not have the mental 
capacity to be executed as defined in section (2), then the Governor 
shall have the inmate committed to a Department of Corrections 
mental health treatment facility.  
(4) When a person under sentence of death has been committed to 
a Department of Corrections mental health treatment facility, he 
or she shall be kept there until the facility administrator deter-
mines that he or she has been restored to sanity. The facility shall 
notify the Governor of his or her determination, and the Governor 
shall appoint another commission as provided in subsection (1). 
(5) The Governor shall allow reasonable fees to psychiatrists ap-
pointed under the provisions of this section that shall be paid by 
the State.  
 
Florida’s Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.811. Insanity at the Time of 
Execution: Capital Cases202 
 
(a) Insanity to Be Executed. A person under sentence of death 
shall not be executed while insane. 
(b) Insanity Defined. A person under sentence of death is insane 
for purposes of execution if the person lacks mental capacity as de-
fined section 922.07(2) of the Florida Statutes. 
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current rule. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.811. 
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(c) Procedure for Determining Insanity. Each psychiatrist’s evalua-
tion (including initial certification to the Governor) shall include a 
review of the inmate’s background history, appropriate psychologi-
cal testing, interview of collateral contacts, administration of the 
questions in Table 1 (below), and at least three clinical interviews 
lasting one to two hours each that include tests to determine ma-
lingering. Each examiner must conduct individual examinations, 
though the other two in the commission, as well as the state and 
defense attorneys, may observe without presence, through either 
simultaneous video, two-way mirror, or the like. All relevant in-
formation shall be summarized in the expert’s report. The expert’s 
report must also include (1) a description and purpose of the tech-
niques, tests, and procedures used in the examination; (2) clinical 
observations, findings, and opinions or instances in which the ex-
pert could not state an opinion; and (3) the sources used for infor-
mation as well as the factual basis for the expert’s conclusions. 
(d) Stay of Execution. No motion for a stay of execution pending a 
hearing, based on grounds of the prisoner’s insanity to be executed, 
shall be entertained by any court until such time as the Governor 
of Florida shall have received certified notice from a psychiatrist in 
accordance with the appropriate Florida Statutes. 
(e) Motion for Stay After Governor’s Determination of Sanity to Be 
Executed. After the Governor signs a death warrant for a prisoner 
under sentence of death and has received a certified opinion of in-
sanity by a psychiatrist that the prisoner lacks competency for 
execution, counsel for the prisoner may move for a stay of execu-
tion and a hearing.  
(1) The motion shall be filed in the circuit court of the circuit in 
which the execution is to take place and shall be heard by one of 
the judges of that circuit or such other judge as shall be assigned 
by the Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court to hear the mo-
tion. The state attorney of the circuit shall represent the State of 
Florida in any proceedings held on the motion. 
(2) The motion shall be in writing and shall contain a certificate of 
counsel that the motion is made in good faith and on reasonable 
grounds to believe that the prisoner to be executed is insane. 
(3) Counsel for the prisoner shall file, along with the motion, all 
reports of experts that were submitted to the Governor pursuant to 
the statutory procedure for executive determination of sanity to be 
executed. If any of the evidence is not available to counsel for the 
prisoner, counsel shall attach to the motion an affidavit so stating, 
with an explanation of why the evidence is unavailable. 
(4) Counsel for the prisoner and the State may submit such other 
evidentiary material and written submissions including reports of 
experts on behalf of the prisoner as shall be relevant to determina-
tion of the issue.  
(5) A copy of the motion and all supporting documents shall be 
served on the Florida Department of Legal Affairs and the state 
attorney of the circuit in which the motion has been filed. 
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(f) Order Granting. If the circuit judge, upon review of the motion 
and submissions, has reasonable grounds to believe that the pris-
oner to be executed is insane, the judge shall grant a stay of execu-
tion and may order further proceedings which may include a hear-
ing pursuant to rule 3.812. 
 
Florida’s Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.812. Hearing on Insanity at 
Time of Execution: Capital Cases203 
 
(a) Hearing on Insanity to Be Executed. The hearing on the pris-
oner’s insanity to be executed shall be a hearing de novo. 
(b) Issue at Hearing. At the hearing the issue shall be whether the 
prisoner presently meets the criteria for insanity at time of execu-
tion as detailed in section 922.07(2) of the Florida Statutes. 
(c) Evidence. At hearings pursuant to this rule, the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege, found in Florida Statute 90.503 shall be 
suspended. A statement not specifically covered in the Evidence 
Code but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustwor-
thiness as in 90.803 and 90.804 of the Evidence Code, is not ex-
cluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the 
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the state-
ment is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any 
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reason-
able efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the in-
terests of justice will be best served by admission of the statement 
into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under 
this exception unless the proponent of it makes it known to the ad-
verse party sufficiently in advance of the hearing to provide the 
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the 
proponent’s intention to offer the statement, and the particulars of 
it, including the name and address of the declarant.204  
(d) Order. If, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court shall find, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the prisoner to be exe-
cuted is insane, the court shall enter its order continuing the stay 
of the death warrant; otherwise, the court shall deny the motion 
and enter its order dissolving the stay of execution. 
B.   Procedural Requirements To Determine Mental Incapacity 
1.   Information Necessary for a Standard Determination of 
Competency 
 Proposed rule 3.811(c) provides a list of procedures that experts 
should follow in determining competency. Accordingly, this Section 
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explains how to fulfill those requirements as well as the rationale for 
including them.  
(a)   Background History 
 Since many mental illnesses have active and recessive phases, an 
examiner should begin by completely reviewing the inmate’s back-
ground history.205 Gathering an inmate’s history need not be done at 
a psychiatrist’s rate, particularly if the attorney raised an issue of 
competency at the trial stage. Most of the necessary information may 
already exist in attorney files and prison records. A file of purely fac-
tual background history should remain available so that a psychia-
trist could simply review the file and request additional informa-
tion.206  
 Historical information on the inmate should include the following: 
(1) military experience, including disciplinary actions taken against 
the inmate, time in combat, experiences which may have led to post-
traumatic stress disorder, contact with hazardous chemicals, psycho-
logical or behavioral problems, and special privileges such as clear-
ance; (2) education; (3) marital or relationship history; (4) a review of 
the inmate’s records; 207 (5) a synopsis of involvement with the legal 
system to determine whether prior competency determinations were 
conducted; (6) past mental health evaluations; (7) familial back-
ground with a focus on tragic occurrences; 208 (8) employment; (9) al-
cohol or drug use; and (10) social functioning.209 Reviewing significant 
events in an inmate’s life aids in understanding the inmate and may 
provide information on conduct-disordered symptoms, cognitive defi-
cits, or even spells of maladjustment. 210 This background information 
                                                                                                                  
 205. For example, schizophrenia has both an active and regressive phase. AMERICAN 
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 103, at 187. 
 206. This file should remain free of the attorney’s opinion work product so that it may 
be used by the State’s experts as well.  
 207. Relevant records include: 
(1) prison medical records; (2) prison psychiatric records; (3) psychiatric records 
prior to incarceration; (4) academic records, including prior intellectual testing 
with raw data; (5) records of past psychological evaluations; (6) any and all 
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havior, and; (11) art work of the inmate. 
Ebert, supra note 138, at 49. The records should also contain a history of prison transfers, 
the rationale behind the transfer, and any disciplinary actions taken against the inmate. 
Id. at 48. 
 208. Some disagreement exists over the importance of this information. For a view that 
family history does not typically assist with diagnosis, see RICHARD ROGERS & DANIEL W. 
SHUMAN, CONDUCTING INSANITY EVALUATIONS 180 (2d ed. 2000). 
 209. Ebert, supra note 138, at 47-48. 
 210. ROGERS & SHUMAN, supra note 208, at 180. 
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supplies a basis for questions in the clinical interview and may help 
detect malingering. 
(b)   Clinical Interview & Tests to Determine Malingering 
 Clinical interviews form the cornerstone of insanity evaluations 
by providing the bridge between static background information and 
present competency assessment. 211 Meeting and speaking with the 
inmate allows examiners to integrate clinical data and acquire essen-
tial information needed to apply the legal standard in a meaningful 
way.212 To evaluate competency for execution, an expert should con-
duct at least three to four clinical interviews, 213 each lasting one to 
two hours.214 Increased dialogue supplies additional data about the 
inmate and fosters more accurate competency assessments. 215  
 Contrary to the procedures in the current Florida Statutes, 216 the 
commission of three examiners should not conduct a joint evaluation. 
Each psychiatrist should conduct his or her own evaluation without 
the physical presence of others in the examining room. 217 Although 
other examiners, and even counsel, could unobtrusively observe 
through the use of a two-way mirror or simultaneous video taping, 
group interviews lead to inaccuracies.218 The presence of any third 
party, including correctional officials and attorneys, undermine the 
effectiveness of the interview by prejudicing and impeding the rela-
tionship between the patient and examiner.219  
 In conducting the interview, the examiner should ask questions 
similar to those provided in Table 1 below.220 These questions focus 
on determining the inmate’s “understanding of the reasons for his 
imprisonment and impending execution.”221 Questions and observa-
tions should also focus on attorney-client interaction.222 The inter-
viewer should draw conclusions based on the rapport between the at-
torney and client, the inmate’s trust in his or her attorney, and any 
communication difficulties between the two.223  
                                                                                                                  
 211. Id. at 151. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Ebert, supra note 138, at 51; see also DAVID A. SHAPIRO, FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGI-
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 214. Ebert, supra note 138, at 51. 
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 218. See id. 
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 221. Small & Otto, supra note 55, at 154; see also Ebert, supra note 138, at 56. 
 222. Small & Otto, supra note 55, at 154. The inmate’s attorney could, of course, be 
present for this part of the examination. This would give the psychiatrist the opportunity 
to observe interaction between the two. 
 223. Id.  
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 The clinical interview provides not only a vital tool for assessing 
attorney-client relations and general mental competency, but also 
remains the most common and respected method to detect malinger-
ing.224 General malingering is defined as “the intentional production 
of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms 
motivated by external incentives, such as financial compensation.”225 
Other types of malingering include pure malingering, defined as 
“feigning of a disorder that does not exist at all in a particular pa-
tient,” partial malingering, defined as a “conscious exaggeration of 
existing symptoms,” and finally, false imputation, which refers to the 
“ascribing of actual symptoms to a cause consciously recognized by 
the patient to have no relationship to the symptoms.”226  
 Regardless of its type, an expert’s ability to recognize malingering 
is of vital interest to a court when determining mental competency 
for execution. Since an inmate faces impending death, the stakes are 
high for self-interested feigning. However, many instruments and 
methods exist to ferret out the mentally ill from the sane.227  
 Experienced mental health professionals look for certain cues and 
indicators based on “etiology, onset, course of treatment, prognosis, 
and other aspects of various mental disorders.”228 Techniques used to 
evaluate authenticity include questioning the individual about 
unlikely symptoms and using methods that require a specified accu-
racy rate by chance.229 Red flags for professionals include: (1) dra-
matic and exaggerated self-presentation;230 (2) deliberate and careful 
manner in answering questions;231 (3) discrepancy between behavior 
and psychiatric diagnosis, including rare or unusual combinations of 
symptoms; 232 and (4) inconsistent self-reporting that indicates con-
tradictory symptoms. 233 Requiring an expert to conduct three to four 
interviews that each last one to two hours ensures that an expert has 
ample time and opportunity to detect malingering. 
                                                                                                                  
 224. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HAND-
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certain situations. See ROGERS, supra note 225, at 143. 
 230. MELTON ET AL., supra note 224, at 54. This self-presentation includes “theatrical 
style, eagerness to discuss symptoms, reports of extreme symptom severity, and indis-
criminant e ndorsement of symptoms.” Id. 
 231. Id. Carefulness may be demonstrated by slowed speech, hesitations, repetition of 
questions, and “extensive use of qualifiers.” Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
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(c)   Psychological Testing 
 Unlike clinical interviews that are often conducted on a case by 
case basis, many standardized instruments aid the examiner in psy-
chological testing. Since a myriad of instruments exist to evaluate 
mental competency, a court may not know whether it is reviewing 
the most reliable data.234 No standardized instrument covers all men-
tal illnesses. 235 Thus, the rules of evidence need to govern competency 
hearings to ensure that all reports conducted by psychiatrists meet a 
threshold of reliability. Certain instruments are better indicators for 
different types of disorders. 236 The need for background history and 
clinical observation will help determine which types of tests examin-
ers should administer to evaluate the inmate.  
 Further difficulty stems from the typical conclusion of “the newer 
the better.” This conclusion is not always accurate in the field of psy-
chiatry.237 For example, although the third edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is newer, the Schedule of 
Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia (SADS) is a better instrument 
for determining malingering and reliability in certain disorders. 238 
 Although the legislature could certainly codify a specific test, this 
one-size-fits-all approach would not address the multi-faceted prob-
lems and methods undertaken by psychiatrists. Instead, adhering to 
Florida’s Rules of Evidence would ensure that the expert based his or 
her opinion on reliable instruments. 239 This also provides the flexibil-
ity necessary to accommodate new technology and differing expert 
opinions. To aid a judge faced with having to determine whether the 
instrument meets the Frye test, Table 2 provides a list of conditions 
and specific tests used to evaluate those conditions. 240  
                                                                                                                  
 234. Table 2 supplies a list of standardized instruments that experts commonly use to 
test for various mental defects. Infra Part VII. 
 235. See id. 
 236. See id. 
 237. ROGERS & SHUMAN, supra note 208, at 217-18. 
 238. Id. at 218. SADS is a test that takes about two to four hours and is used to help 
diagnose psychotic and mood disorders. It uses “an informal rapport-building interview,” 
akin to the clinical interview, to increase reliability and prevent patient alienation. Id. at 
219. Once the examiner completes the informal interview, formal questions consisting of 
three main inquiries are asked: (1) “standard questions,” performed on all patients; (2) “op-
tional probes,” used to elicit additional information for clarification; and (3) “unstructured 
questions,” for extensive additional information. Id. Examiners base final ratings not only 
on the patient’s answers, but on the totality of the clinical data. Id. 
 239. See EHRHARDT, supra note 146, § 704.1, at 641. The psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege would not apply. 
 240. See infra Part VII. 
2004]                         COMPETENCY FOR EXECUTION  367 
 
(d)   Interview of Collateral Contacts 
 In addition to using the appropriate methodology in psychological 
testing, examiners should collect and review information from collat-
eral contacts. 241 Collateral contacts may include health care provid-
ers, former psychiatrists, family members, attorneys, friends, and 
correctional officers. This information provides important clinical 
data about the inmate’s day to day functioning.242 Friends and family 
members may supply a well-rounded history about specific symptoms 
and impairments the inmate experienced before his or her prison 
sentence.243  
 Examiners should use collateral contacts only as additional 
sources of information for comparison purposes. 244 Given the subjec-
tive nature of mental illness, these collateral interviews should not 
outweigh or discount self-reporting mechanisms. 245 The interviews 
add to the overall picture and aid in assessing the individual in his or 
her entirety.246  
2.   Pertinent Conditions in Competency Determinations 
 When conducting interviews and administering tests, two condi-
tions merit special attention. Although a myriad of conditions, if se-
vere enough, could lead to a finding of incompetency, schizophrenia 
and post-traumatic stress disorder seem to recur frequently in death 
row inmates. Courts often recognize schizophrenia as a mentally de-
bilitating disease; however, they often overlook post-traumatic stress 
disorder due to a lack of outward manifestations and the disease’s 
relative infancy in the field of psychiatry.247 
(a)   Schizophrenia 
 Schizophrenic disorders comprised 62.2% of defendants acquitted 
due to insanity in general post-verdict diagnoses. 248 Schizophrenia 
may, at certain times, be difficult to diagnose because it has both an 
active and regressive phase.249 An essential feature of the illness is 
the presence of psychotic symptoms during the active phase.250 Psy-
chotic symptoms include “delusions, hallucinations, or certain char-
                                                                                                                  
 241. ROGERS & SHUMAN, supra note 208, at 180. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id.  
 244. Ebert, supra note 138, at 50. 
 245. ROGERS & SHUMAN, supra note 208, at 181. 
 246. See id. 
 247. Id. at 161. 
 248. Id. at 159. 
 249. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 103, at 187. 
 250. Id. 
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acteristic disturbances [that] affect . . . the form of thought.”251 Delu-
sions often involve the belief that “others are spying on, spreading 
false rumors about, or planning to harm the person.”252 Possibly due 
to the disease’s outward manifestations, courts tend to agree with 
experts’ recommendations when the recommendations include a psy-
chotic diagnosis such as schizophrenia.253 
(b)   Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
 Courts seem more hesitant to qualify a person with post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as mentally ill. 254 However, PTSD’s 
prevalence and recognition may increase after Operation Iraqi Free-
dom.255 Despite the fact that PTSD often causes flashbacks that im-
pair cognitive or volitional capacity, examiners rarely assert these 
disorders as a primary diagnosis in insanity cases. 256 Historically, 
verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) are less successful 
in PTSD cases, comprising only 28.6% of NGRI verdicts. 257 Other dis-
orders have a 41.5% success rate.258 Yet, since the third edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders officially rec-
ognized PTSD as an official diagnosis in 1980, diagnostic criteria 
have been modified and refined to enable clinicians to not only diag-
nose the disease, but also to recognize any malingering associated 
with it. 259  
 Using an inmate’s background history, examiners should look for 
eleven pre-trauma vulnerability factors: 
(1) female gender, (2) early sexual or other childhood trauma, (3) 
parental poverty, (4) behavior disorder in childhood or adolescence, 
(5) early separation or divorce of parents before age 10, (6) intro-
version, (7) poor self-confidence before age 15, (8) prior psychiatric 
disorder, (9) a history of psychiatric illness among first-degree 
                                                                                                                  
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 188. 
 253. ROGERS & SHUMAN, supra note 208, at 159-60. 
 254. For an overview on post-traumatic stress disorder in civil claims, see Nicholas J. 
Motherway, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, in 49 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 73 (1987). 
 255. Veterans’ hospitals are gearing up for the increase in patients. See The Early 
Show: Benefits for Returning Vets?, (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 15, 2003), at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/04/15/earlyshow/health/main549434.shtml (last vis-
ited Oct. 2, 2003). For an article concerning post-traumatic stress disorders after Vietnam, 
see Debra D. Burke & Mary Anne Nixon, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Death 
Penalty, 38 HOW. L.J. 183 (1994). 
 256. ROGERS & SHUMAN, supra note 208, at 160-61. 
 257. Id. at 161. 
 258. Id.  
 259. ROGERS, supra note 225, at 131. 
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relatives, (10) life stress before and after the trauma, and (11) high 
neuroticism.260 
Examiners may diagnose malingering by carefully examining the 
inmate’s background history, treatment efforts, and corroboration of 
information.261 If Florida adopts the suggested ideal statute and pro-
cedure, examiners will have ready access to information that would 
set off red flags and trigger the need for a closer PTSD examination.  
 Although PTSD may not always be severe enough to result in in-
competency for execution, its debilitating nature combined with the 
probable increase of post-war cases merits special attention in com-
petency examinations. PTSD and schizophrenia stand out due to 
their prevalence in death row inmates; however, any severe mental 
illness could render an inmate incompetent for execution.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Florida’s procedure and standard for assessing competency for 
execution remain the same today as they did sixteen years ago when 
the legislature hastily responded to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Ford v. Wainwright.262 Rather than supplying consistency, this stag-
nation simply perpetuates Florida’s status as an equal-opportunity 
state for executions. Regardless of whether the incarcerated individ-
ual believes he is Jesus and that the Government wants to execute 
him for saving the world,263 or whether the individual is a nineteen-
year-old inmate of a Cuban mental asylum with paranoid schizo-
phrenia,264 until the law changes, they both remain competent in the 
eyes of Florida. By affording inmates on death row one final due 
                                                                                                                  
 260. Id. at 141 (citing J. Davidson, Issues in the Diagnosis of Posttraumatic Stress D is-
order, in REVIEW OF PSYCHIATRY (J.M. Oldham et al. eds., 1993)). 
 261. Id. 
 262. See In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 518 So. 2d 256 
(Fla. 1987). 
 263. See Initial Brief of Appellant at 5, Provenzano v. State, 750 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1999) 
(No. 96,453). The doctor examining Provenzano stated:  
 Mr. Provenzano knows, not thinks or believes, that the reason that he is to be 
executed is because “They” believe that he is Jesus Christ. Those who seek to 
execute him hate and fear Jesus Christ and if he is dead then Jesus Christ is 
dead and that is their goal . . . .  
 He does not connect the courthouse shooting with the execution. It is unre-
lated because he is innocent.”  
Id.  
 264. See Medina v. State, 690 So. 2d 1241, 1250 (Fla. 1997) (Anstead, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part) (pointing out that the majority failed to mention that Medina was 
a nineteen-year-old inmate of a Cuban mental asylum, that he was psychotic, and had or-
ganic brain damage as well as paranoid schizophrenia). Medina was executed on March 25, 
1997, despite the fact that “the State possessed evidence that implicated Joseph Daniels in 
the murder and failed to disclose this evidence to the defendant.” Id. at 1252.  
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process right, Florida will not only increase the legitimacy of its own 
process, but may find that the condemned are actually innocent.265 
 Bruce Ebert, Ph.D., J.D., ABPP, produced the following two tables 
to facilitate effective competency for execution evaluations.266 Ebert is 
a clinical and forensic psychologist as well as an attorney. He also 
works as a professor of psychology at the Professional School of Psy-
chology and as an assistant professor of psychiatry in the School of 
Medicine at the University of California Davis. In addition, he serves 
as president and CEO of the Center for Mental Health Law and Eth-
ics.  
 Table 1 provides psychiatrists with a standardized list of ques-
tions to ask each inmate examined. This table guarantees that all 
inmates will answer the same minimal questions. Of course, examin-
ers are encouraged to investigate additional conditions. Judges pre-
siding over competency for execution hearings may find Table 2 par-
ticularly helpful in determining whether the evaluation methods 
meet the Frye test requirements.  
VI.   TABLE 1: A PROPOSED INSTRUMENT FOR EVALUATING COMPE-
TENCY FOR EXECUTION267 
Ratings should be as follows: 
0: No Capacity 
1: Some Incapacity 
2: Mild Incapacity 
3: Moderate Incapacity 
4: Severe Incapacity 
5: Complete Incapacity 
The inmate’s cognitive level should be evaluated by the factors in 
the numbered subsections. Under each subsection is a general list 
                                                                                                                  
 265. The Innocence Project’s work just began in Tallahassee, Florida, with the help of 
Florida State University College of Law students. As of May 2, 2003, the project has exon-
erated 127 inmates nationally by using DNA evidence. This evidence may play a vital role 
in helping wrongfully convicted, mentally ill prisoners currently serving time on death row. 
See also Michael Mello, Outlaw Judiciary: On Lies, Secrets, and Silence: The Florida Su-
preme Court Deals with Death Row Claims of Actual Innocence, 1 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 259 
(1996). 
 266. These tables have been changed somewhat, and Table 1 is actually Ebert’s Table 2 
and vice versa. 
 267. This table is derived from Ebert, supra note 138, at 56-57.  
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of questions. A rating of 3-5 should result in a determination of in-
sanity, and the inmate is not competent for execution. 
(1) Ability to identify what is about to happen. 
What is set for ____, 200_ (date of execution)? 
What is going to happen to you? 
(2) Ability to understand and conceptualize that the person is 
housed on death row. 
What happens to other inmates on death row? 
What do you do everyday? 
How is what you do from day-to-day now different from when be-
fore you were in jail? 
(3) Ability to understand the meaning of the term and concept of 
punishment. 
What does it mean to punish someone? 
For what type of things should someone be punished? 
(4) Ability to work with attorney. 
What is your attorney’s name? 
How often do you speak with your attorney? 
Do you trust your attorney? 
Do you think your attorney has a good understanding of the fac-
tual background of your case? 
If you heard of new evidence what would you do? Who would you 
tell? 
(5) Ability to understand the sentence of death. 
What is going to be your punishment for your conviction? 
Tell me what the death penalty means to you. 
Do you agree with things that people have told you about the 
death penalty? 
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(6) Ability to understand the reason for the punishment of death. 
Why are you going to be executed? 
Tell me the reason the judge/jury decided that you should die. 
What did you do to be given the death penalty? 
(7) Ability to conceptualize what will happen when the punishment 
is carried out. 
What will happen when you are executed? 
Where will you go after you are put to death? 
(8) Ability to describe the role of the key people involved in the 
punishment. 
Defense attorney 
Correctional officers who will escort the inmate 
Executioners (those involved in carrying out the sentence) 
Minister 
Victim’s family 
Inmate’s family and friends 
(9) Ability to provide recent facts that may be helpful to deal with 
the issue of current competency. 
Ask conversational questions about day-to-day life, how the inmate 
is feeling both physically and emotionally.  
Ask if anything unusual has happened. 
Look for ability to speak spontaneously and make sense. 
Look for coherent, logical thought patterns. 
(10) Ability to voluntarily control thoughts. 
Look for spontaneous outbursts. 
Look for coherent sentence patterns and logical connections be-
tween conversation topics. 
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(11) Ability to perceive reality in the present. 
How old are you? 
When is your birthday? 
What did you have for breakfast this morning? 
What year is it? 
VII.   TABLE 2: PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING AND SPECIFIC USES268 
Condition 
 
Tests used to Evaluate 
  
(1) Intellectual 
Deficits 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Third Edition 
(WAIS-III) 
 Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Revised 
(WAIS-R) 
 Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children Revised 
(WISC-R)(children under 16) 
 Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children Third 
Edition (WISC-III)(Children under 16) 
 Kaufman 
 Shipley 
 Otis Quick Score 
 Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) 
 Ravens Progressive Matrices 
 Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale 
 Severe Cognitive Impairment Profile (SCIP) 
 Differential Ability Scales (DAS) 
 Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (K-Bit) 
 Ray Auditory Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT) 
 Bender 
 Benton 
 Cognitive Difficulties Scale 
 Scales of Independent Behavior 
                                                                                                                  
 268. Ebert, supra note 138, at 53-55. 
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 Vineland 
 MicorCog: Assessment of Cognitive Functioning 
(2) Memory 
Problems 
Wechsler Memory Scale – Revised (WMSR) 
 Wechsler Memory Scale (WAS) 
 Wechsler Memory Scale III (WAS-III) 
 WRAT-3 
 Memory for Designs 
 Wide Range Assessment of Memory and Learning 
(WRAML) 
(3) Personality 
Disorder 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI; scale 4 and subscales) 
 Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 
(MMPI-2; scale 4 and subscales) 
 Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI) 
 Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI-II) 
 Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF 
clinical) 
 Stait-Trait Anger Inv. 
 Personality Assessment Inventory; antisocial and 
borderline features scales 
 Personality Inventory for Children 
(4) Personality 
Functioning 
Above tests listed in (3) 
 California Psychological Inventory (CPI, Form 34, 
3rd Edition) 
 Rorschach 
 HTP 
(5) Interper-
sonal Rela-
tions 
Thematic Apperception Test 
 Children’s Appreciation Test 
 MMPI; MCMI-II 
 PIC 
 HTP 
 Family Drawings 
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(6) Depression MMPI and MMPI-2 
 MCMI and MCMI-II 
 Beck Depression Inventory 
 IPAT Depression Scale 
 Rorschach Depression Scale 
(7) Suicide Suicide Probability Scale 
 MMPI and MMPI-2 Scale 2 Elevation 
 Rorschach Suicide Constellation 
(8) Alcohol 
Problem 
Alcohol Use Inventory 
 Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test (MAST) 
 MMPI and MMPI-2 MacAndrews Alcohol  Scale 
 MCMI and MCMI-II Alcohol Scale 
(9) Schizo-
phrenia 
Rorschach; Schizophrenia Scale; F-R’s 
 MMPI and MMPI-2 Scale 8 and Subscales 
 MCMI and MCMI-II Thought Disorder  Scale 
 WAIS-R (examining intellectual deterioration) 
 HTP 
(10) Post 
Traumatic 
Stress Disor-
der (PTSD) 
MMPI-2 PTSD Scales (2 such scales) 
 MCMI-II 
 Rorschach (examining trauma indicators) 
(11) Bipolar 
Disorder 
MCMI-II Mania Scale 
 MMPI and MMPI-2 Scale 9 
(12) Anxiety 
Disorder 
IPAT Anxiety Scale 
 Stait-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
 MMPI and MMPI-2 Scale and 8 and Anxiety Sub-
scales 
 MCMI-II 
 PAI 
 PIC 
376  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:335 
 
 HTP with specific scoring criteria (UCLA) 
 Phobia and Anxiety Checklist 
(13) Adjust-
ment Disor-
ders 
MMPI and MMP-2 
 MCMI-II 
 Symptom Checklists such as MOONey or SCL-
90-R 
 Rorschach 
 16PF 
(14) Psycho-
somatic Dis-
orders 
Million Behavioral Health Inventory (MBHI) 
(15) Neuro-
psychological 
Problems 
Henry Reitan Neuropsychological Tests 
 Luria-Nebraska 
 WAIS-R, WAIS-III 
 Maddis Dementia Rating Scale 
 Process Assessment 
 
 
